The OMDS/VGSE Vienna Joint Economics seminar is held weekly on Thursdays during the term.
VJE-Seminars scheduled in June:
- Speaker: Margit Reischer (Georgetown University)
- Title: Finance-thy-Neighbor. Trade Credit Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations.
- Time: Thursday, June 25, 1:15 – 2:45 pm
- Location: Lecture Hall 12 (2-floor), OMP-1
- Abstract: This paper studies the smoothing and amplifying features of trade credit for the propagation of shocks in a multisector economy with working capital constraints. I derive aggregation results for sectoral shocks in inefficient economies when distortions are interdependent due to endogenous trade credit linkages and costs. A quantitative application to the U.S. during the 2008-09Great Recession suggests that trade credit smooths financial shocks, while generating large spillovers relative to an economy with bank finance only. Sectors with a higher ratio of trade credit extended to bank loans are systemically important.
- Speaker: Benjamin Moll (LSE)
- Title: New Frontiers in Heterogeneous Agent Macroeconomics
- Time: Thursday, June 11, 1:15 – 2:45 pm
- Location: Lecture Hall 12 (2-floor), OMP-1
- Abstract: This talk will be based on the Cowles Lecture that I will give at the North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society a week earlier. I will discuss some recent developments in the literature using heterogeneous agent models to study macro-inequality interactions and to discipline macro models with micro data. Part of the lecture will discuss some of my recent work on expectation formation in heterogeneous agent models https://benjaminmoll.com/challenge/ and https://benjaminmoll.com/MFGRatx/ and work on bringing ideas from reinforcement learning to macroeconomics https://benjaminmoll.com/SRL/ and https://benjaminmoll.com/RSPG/.
- Speaker: Barton Lee (ETH Zurich)
- Title: Market Power Is Power (joint with Gabriele Gratton)
- Time: Thursday, June 18, 1:15 – 2:45 pm
- Location: Lecture Hall 12 (2-floor), OMP-1
- Abstract: We argue that in market democracies firms can wield political power through a mechanism that does not rely on lobbying, campaign contributions, or persuasion. When voters cannot commit to future regulation, firms can use irreversible technological investments to reshape ex-post political incentives. We call this mechanism the political hold-up problem. We show that, in equilibrium, a firm's de facto power to avoid regulation coincides with standard measures of market power. This form of power is robust to a wide range of regulatory instruments, including bans, taxes, self-regulation, and delegation to technocrats, and limits the effectiveness of reforms targeting political influence. The political hold-up problem distorts the direction of technological progress and may increase political demand for populism and nationalization. Institutional remedies instead require commitment: supermajoritarian institutions and independent oversight of industry standards.
